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26. TORT LAW 
Kumaralingam AMIRTHALINGAM 
LLB (Hons), PhD (Australian National University);  
Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. 
Gary CHAN Kok Yew 
LLB (Hons), MA (National University of Singapore),  
LLM, BA (University of London);  
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
Breach of statutory duty 
26.1 Tan Shiang Kok v SCM Services and the Management 
Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2811 and Exceltec Property Management 
Pte Ltd [2015] SGDC 88 (“Tan Shiang Kok”) concerns a claim for breach 
of statutory duty pursuant to s 29 of the Building Maintenance and 
Strata Management Act (Cap 30C, 2008 Rev Ed) which provides for the 
duty of a Management Corporation: 
… to control, manage and administer the common property for the 
benefit of all the subsidiary proprietors … and to properly maintain 
and keep in good state and serviceable repair the common property. 
(The claim in negligence is discussed below at para 26.70.) The plaintiff, 
who occupied one ground floor unit in a commercial building, claimed 
for serious injuries suffered when he slipped and fell inside a wet toilet 
located within the commercial building. The second defendant was the 
Management Corporation of the commercial building and the first 
defendant was the cleaning company engaged by the second defendant. 
Based on the evidence, the District Court concluded (at [16]) that the 
second defendant had breached its statutory duty. 
26.2 It should be noted that one of the legal requirements for an 
action in breach of statutory duty is that Parliament had intended via 
the statute to confer on such an occupier of the premises a private right 
of action to sue in tort. Under the law, the plaintiff had to show that he 
was part of a limited class which the statute intended to protect: see 
Loh Luan Choo Betsy v Foo Wah Jek [2005] 1 SLR(R) 64 at [25] and 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia 
Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788. The 
District Court seemed to have assumed that this was the case without 
any discussion. In this regard, one relevant provision was s 88(1) which 
states that: 
If a management corporation … commits a breach of any provision of 
this Part, or makes default in complying with any requirement of, or 
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duty imposed on it by, any provision of this Part, … occupier of a lot 
shall be entitled to apply to the court … to recover damages for any 
loss or injury to the … occupier … arising out of the breach of any 
such provision from the management corporation … [emphasis 
added] 
From the wording of the provision, it is likely that Parliament intended 
to protect occupiers of a unit within the commercial building such as 
the plaintiff from the statutory breaches of the management corporation 
(for a discussion of the scope of s 88, see Diora-Ace Ltd v Management 
Corporation Strata Title Plan No 3661 [2015] 3 SLR 620 and 
Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2911 v Tham Keng Mun 
[2011] 1 SLR 1263). 
Confidence 
26.3 In the two cases below, a distinction in approach to a scenario 
involving the stealing of commercial and trade secrets in an 
employment context and personal and private information of an 
individual obtained surreptitiously can be seen. In Tempcool 
Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Chong Vincent [2015] SGHC 100 (“Tempcool”), 
the plaintiff company sued its ex-employees (“Woon” and “Vincent”) 
and the new company (“UBZ”) which the ex-employees had joined for 
stealing the plaintiff ’s trade secrets and confidential information. The 
High Court found that the plaintiff ’s drawings had the necessary quality 
of confidence as the drawings remained relatively inaccessible to the 
public. Moreover, they remained confidential as a whole even though 
certain aspects of the drawings were in the public domain (Invenpro (M) 
Sdn Bhd v JCS Automation Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 1045). Woon and 
Vincent were aware that the plaintiff ’s drawings were confidential, and 
they were received and imparted in circumstances so as to import an 
obligation of confidentiality. As UBZ was the corporate vehicle through 
which Woon intended to use the confidential information, his 
knowledge was also imputed to UBZ. It should be noted that Woon was 
both the director and shareholder of UBZ. 
26.4 As Woon had solicited Vincent to breach his obligation of 
confidence by copying the plaintiff ’s confidential information and 
sending it to him, the learned judge concluded that Woon had misused 
the confidential information. The corporate vehicle used by Woon, 
UBZ, was also liable for the misuse as the drawings and pricing 
information in the hands of Woon and UBZ were regarded as 
detrimental to the plaintiff. The High Court noted that Woon used the 
drawings to help the plaintiff ’s customers communicate with suppliers 
and thereby foster goodwill, and allowed UBZ to serve the plaintiff ’s 
customers without any need to return to the plaintiff for post-project 
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help. The High Court further noted that the pricing information 
enabled Woon to compare prices quoted by the suppliers to the plaintiff 
and allowed UBZ to craft better bids in present or future project tenders. 
To the extent that the evidence showed that the defendants had 
exploited the plaintiff ’s confidential information for their own benefit 
(see Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 
1 AC 109 at 255, per Lord Keith), it may be argued that the requirement 
of detriment to the plaintiff was satisfied. 
26.5 In comparison, ANB v ANC [2015] 5 SLR 522 involved divorce 
proceedings between the appellant (husband) and the wife (first 
respondent). The wife had obtained information from the husband’s 
personal notebook computer in the matrimonial home. The information 
was passed to the second respondent (a law firm) for use in the divorce 
proceedings. The husband commenced proceedings claiming breach of 
confidence and applied for an interim injunction. The issue, with 
respect to interim injunction, was whether there was a serious question 
to be tried as to the existence of a breach of confidence by the 
respondents. The Court of Appeal held that the balance of convenience 
lay in favour of granting an injunction to preserve the confidential (or 
private) quality of the information. 
26.6 The elements in a breach of confidence case outlined in Coco v 
A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 (“Coco v A N Clark”) are as 
follows: (a) the information to be protected must have the necessary 
quality of confidence about it; (b) that information must have been 
imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence; 
and (c) there must be an unauthorised use of the information to the 
detriment of the party who originally communicated it. The present case 
involved “surreptitious taking of personal information”: ANB v ANC  
at [18]. Instead of the elements in Coco v A N Clark, the relevant 
question to ask, according to the Court of Appeal, was whether the 
plaintiff had a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in relation to that 
information: Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [21],  
per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, and [85], per Lord Hope of Craighead. 
There was also no need to prove that there had been a misuse of the 
information. This development suggests that Singapore courts are 
prepared to directly examine the legal elements pertaining to the 
protection of privacy interests instead of attempting to “shoe-horn” 
privacy interests within the traditional parameters of the equitable 
action of breach of confidence. Applying the second requirement in 
Coco v A N Clark above that the information must be imparted in 
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence, for instance, to a 
case of surreptitious taking of personal information, would appear quite 
out of place. 
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Conspiracy 
26.7 There have been numerous claims made under the tort of civil 
conspiracy, but many of them have been dismissed by the courts in 2015 
for want of basic evidence required for establishing the legal elements of 
the tort. This section begins with two cases in which the claim in 
conspiracy succeeded followed by the problematic cases. One of the 
cases below also dealt with an application for mandatory injunction for 
conspiracy. 
Principles on proof and quantification of damages 
26.8 Li Siu Lun v Looi Kok Poh [2015] 4 SLR 667 (“Li Siu Lun”) 
discusses important principles for the assessment of damages in a civil 
conspiracy case. The plaintiff, a patient at the defendant hospital, 
suffered injury to his right hand. Upon surgery performed by the doctor, 
the condition of his hand worsened. It was later discovered that the form 
on which the plaintiff had given his consent to surgical procedure for 
the right hand had been altered by a nurse who was employed by the 
defendant hospital. The plaintiff had only given consent to one surgical 
procedure performed by the doctor, but the form was altered to indicate 
that he had consented to an additional surgical procedure. Further, the 
hospital had concealed the alteration from him. The plaintiff took out 
an action in trespass and negligence against the doctor which claims 
were eventually settled. There was a separate action against the hospital 
(which included a claim in conspiracy) that proceeded till the third day 
of trial. Consent judgment was entered against the hospital in respect of 
the alteration and damages were assessed by the assistant registrar. On 
appeal against the assistant registrar’s assessment, the High Court 
outlined the following principles: 
(a) Where there is sufficient evidence of the existence of 
pecuniary loss, damages will be awarded even if the plaintiff 
cannot prove the precise quantum of its losses. Such damages 
are said to be at large. In order to compute the quantum of 
damages, the court should refer to “the yardstick of the 
reasonable man”: at [45], citing Dootson Investment Corp v 
Highway Video Pte Ltd [1997] 3 SLR(R) 823 at [7], per 
G P Selvam J. Belinda Ang Saw Ean J also stated that this 
approach was consistent with “common sense to achieve justice, 
not only to the plaintiff but the defendant, and, if applicable, 
among the defendants”: at [61], citing Holtby v Brigham & 
Cowan (Hull) Ltd [2000] EWCA Civ J0406-11; [2000] 
3 All ER 421 at [20], per Stuart-Smith LJ. 
(b) There is, however, no need to have recourse to the 
“yardstick of the reasonable man” where there is evidence of the 
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precise quantum of loss. In the present case, the investigatory 
expenses incurred by the plaintiff to uncover the conspiracy 
(that is, the travel costs of the plaintiff ’s visits to the hospital in 
Singapore from Hong Kong where he resided and the costs of 
applying for interrogatories) were recoverable (British Motor 
Trade Association v Salvadori [1949] Ch 556; Lonrho plc v Fayed 
(No 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489; and R+V Versicherung AG v Risk 
Insurance and Reinsurance Solutions SA [2006] EWHC 42 
(Comm)). The plaintiff had to serve interrogatories on the 
nurse and it was in the interrogatories that she admitted that she 
had altered the consent form at the request of the doctor. It is 
also important to note that in its defence and at the stage of the 
plaintiff ’s application to serve interrogatories, the hospital had 
explicitly denied amending the consent form. When the 
concealed alteration was uncovered, the claim in conspiracy was 
added to the action against the hospital. 
(c) Aggravated damages may be awarded for conspiracy 
based on the “exceptional” conduct of the defendant: Tan 
Harry v Teo Chee Yeow Aloysius [2004] 1 SLR(R) 513. The 
damage is “parasitic” on compensatory damages being 
recoverable. 
(d) There exists a proportionality principle in assessing 
aggravated damages relative to the amount of general damages 
recoverable (see Koh Sin Chong Freddie v Chan Cheng Wah 
Bernard [2013] 4 SLR 629 in the context of defamation). The 
assistant registrar had awarded $240,000 as aggravated damages. 
In the present case, Ang J took the view that the sum of $42,000 
awarded as aggravated damages, being twice the amount of the 
general damages ($21,000), would not be disproportionate. 
(e) No punitive damages were awarded as the present case 
did not fall into the categories in Rookes v Barnard [1964] 
AC 1129 (namely (a) the oppressive, arbitrary or 
unconstitutional actions by the servants of the government; (b) 
where there is wrongful conduct which has been calculated by 
the defendant to make a profit for himself which may exceed 
the compensation payable to the plaintiff; and (c) where 
punitive awards are expressly authorised by statute). Even if the 
facts of the case fell within one of the Rookes v Barnard 
categories, the court was entitled to exercise its discretion 
against awarding punitive damages, highlighting the limited 
scope for the award of punitive damages in tort law. 
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Combination and intention to injure the plaintiff 
26.9 The claim in conspiracy succeeded in Tempcool (facts described 
in paras 26.3–26.4 above). Edmund Leow JC held that a combination 
amongst the ex-employees and the corporate vehicle may be inferred 
from the circumstances. There was an agreement by Vincent to obtain 
the confidential information from the plaintiff company and pass them 
on to Woon and/or UBZ for their use. First, Leow JC stated that “the 
damage to Tempcool was not incidental to [the defendants’] goals”. Here 
both the plaintiff and UBZ were direct competitors. The learned judge 
also noted (at [65]) that the “agreement for Vincent to extract 
Tempcool’s information for Woon’s uses was inextricably bound up with 
an intention to hurt Tempcool’s business interests”. The above 
observations suggest that the intention to damage the plaintiff ’s business 
was connected in some way to the defendants’ goals and agreement to 
obtain the confidential information. However, what was essential for the 
establishment of the tort of conspiracy was that the defendant’s 
conspiratorial acts were undertaken with the intention to injure the 
plaintiff as a means to an end or as an end in itself: see EFT Holdings, 
Inc v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 860 
(“Marinteknik”) at [101]). 
26.10 Under conspiracy, pecuniary loss must be proved though strict 
proof of specific pecuniary damage is not necessary: Li Siu Lun at [43]. 
The High Court only referred to the likelihood that the information 
could be used to compete with the plaintiff for similar jobs. Whether 
such evidence would be sufficient to assess the quantum of pecuniary 
loss should be based on the “yardstick of the reasonable man” (see 
para 26.8 above). There was no need to determine this as yet for the 
learned judge decided only on liability, with assessment of damages to 
be made at a later date. 
Failure to prove the basic elements of conspiracy 
26.11 In the following cases, there were problems in adducing 
evidence to prove the basic elements of the tort whether in respect of the 
existence of conspiratorial acts, unlawful means, the state of mind of the 
conspirators and damage. In ARS v ART [2015] SGHC 78, the plaintiff 
alleged that the first defendant had conspired with two other parties to 
injure the plaintiff through the breach of two agreements. This claim 
failed due to the non-existence of the two agreements. Moreover, there 
was no agreement or a combination to breach the two agreements. 
Finally, the plaintiff ’s claim that the first defendant conspired with two 
other parties to maliciously publish false words about the plaintiff ’s 
design or business by way of three letters was dismissed as the words 
were not false and the letters were written by another party whose act 
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could not be attributed to the first defendant. In Gimpex Ltd v Unity 
Holdings Business Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 686, Gimpex Ltd (“Gimpex”) entered 
into a contract to purchase coal from Unity Holdings Business Ltd 
(“Unity”). The second defendant held 25% of the shares in Unity. The 
third defendant was the sole shareholder and director of the second 
defendant. Gimpex failed to prove its case of unlawful conspiracy as 
there was no evidence of fraud committed against Gimpex. As for 
Gimpex’s lawful means conspiracy claim, there was also insufficient 
evidence to suggest that the defendants had caused the first defendant to 
enter into a contract with Gimpex with the predominant purpose of 
harming Gimpex. 
26.12 In Tanaka Lumber Pte Ltd v Datuk Haji Mohammad Tufail bin 
Mahmud [2015] SGHC 276, Tanaka Lumber Pte Ltd (“Tanaka”), 
a Singapore company, claimed that two of its shareholders, Tufail 
and Ting, committed breach of trust in respect of certain sums of money 
for investments in two Malaysian companies as well as breach of 
fiduciary duties owed to Tanaka. Whilst Ting admitted to being a 
trustee, Tufail denied it. Tufail further counterclaimed that Tanaka, Ting 
and/or Ling (another shareholder in Tanaka) had engaged in a 
conspiracy against him in causing Tanaka to commence the legal action 
against him. This counterclaim in unlawful means conspiracy failed on 
three grounds. First, commencing an action is not itself an unlawful act. 
Moreover, Tufail’s assertion that there was an agreement to fabricate 
evidence in order to commence the action had not been proven. 
Secondly, if the intention of the alleged conspirators to commence the 
action were to wrest control of Tanaka and obtain beneficial ownership 
of the shares, that would not have amounted to an intention to injure 
Tufail, a requirement for a claim in conspiracy. Thirdly, any legal costs 
that might be incurred by Tufail in defending the action per se would 
not constitute damage under conspiracy as the “cost that would have 
been incurred regardless of whether Tanaka’s claim against them was 
well-founded or not”: at [55], citing Sandz Solutions (Singapore) Pte 
Ltd v Strategic Worldwide Assets Ltd [2014] 3 SLR 562. Tanaka’s claims in 
breaches of trust and fiduciary duty also failed and the learned judge 
exercised his discretion not to award costs to the parties for the claims 
and counterclaim. 
Mandatory injunction 
26.13 Viknesh Dairy Farm Pte Ltd v Balakrishnan s/o P S Maniam 
[2015] SGHC 27 is a case where the proof of alleged conspiratorial acts 
and common design were absent. The plaintiff dairy farm – a lessee of 
farmland from the Singapore Land Authority (“SLA”) – sought a 
mandatory injunction against the defendants to remove truckloads of 
earth dumped on the farm. The first defendant had fraudulently 
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represented to the plaintiff that he was a professional engineer who 
could help the plaintiff obtain the certificate of statutory completion. 
The first defendant also testified that all the defendants had colluded to 
defraud the plaintiff. The second and third defendants were specialised 
construction earthwork companies. The testimony was, however, 
rejected by the High Court. The High Court found instead that the first 
defendant, purportedly acting as the plaintiff ’s agent, had entered into 
separate agreements with the second and third defendants to allow them 
to dump earth on the farm upon the payment of an agreed fee to the 
first defendant. The second and third defendants were not aware that 
the land belonged to SLA or that it was illegal to dump the earth on the 
farm. The High Court did not specifically connect the above-mentioned 
facts to the legal requirements in conspiracy, but it could be surmised 
that the acts by the second and third defendants in dumping the earth 
on the farm were not done in furtherance of a common design under 
the tort of conspiracy. As the claim in conspiracy failed, the High Court 
granted a mandatory injunction against the first defendant solely for 
him to remove the dumped earth from the plaintiff ’s land. 
Conversion and detinue 
26.14 Marco Polo Shipping Co Pte Ltd v Fairmacs Shipping & Transport 
Services Pte Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 541 (“Marco Polo”) concerns the 
assessment of damages arising from the conversion of goods (in this 
case, river sand) purchased by the respondent. The appellant was the 
owner of the vessels which transported the river sand. The proper 
method to be used in this case, according to the Court of Appeal, was to 
assess damages based on the cost replacement method, that is, the 
amount paid by the respondent for the sand. The normal method of 
computing damages based on market value at the date of conversion 
depended on the existence of a market which in turn required the 
presence of willing buyers and sellers and the ability of the parties to 
negotiate: Chartered Electronics Industries Pte Ltd v Comtech IT Pte Ltd 
[1998] 2 SLR(R) 1010. 
26.15 This method could not be adopted as there was no relevant 
market from which the court could properly derive the market value. 
Thus, the Court of Appeal differed from the High Court’s approach in 
Fairmacs Shipping & Transport Services Pte Ltd v Harikutai Engineering 
Pte Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 904 in which damages were assessed based on the 
market value of the river sand at the relevant time and deductions made 
to take account of freight, customs and landing costs. One point of 
contention was that the learned judge had made reference to the sales 
figures of a related company at the relevant time. The Court of Appeal 
observed that those figures did not constitute sufficient evidence of the 
existence of the market value. The market in which the respondent was 
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involved in (“wholesale market”) was “very different” [emphasis in 
original] from that in which the related company participated (“retail 
market”) where the goods may be sold at significantly marked-up prices 
(see the analogous case of Furness v Adrium Industries Pty Ltd [1996] 
1 VR 668): Marco Polo at [27]. 
26.16 The plaintiff was in the business of engineering, supply and 
design of refrigeration and air-conditioning systems in Tempcool (above, 
para 26.3). One legal issue which arose was whether the tort of 
conversion would apply to the confidential information obtained by the 
defendants or whether the tort was confined to chattels. The High Court 
allowed the plaintiff ’s claims in breach of confidence and conspiracy 
(see paras 26.3–26.4 and 26.9 above) and did not have to decide on this 
specific point on conversion. Note that the majority in OBG Ltd v Allan 
[2008] 1 AC 1 (Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale dissenting) had 
decided that intangibles cannot be the subject of conversion since they 
cannot be subject to the fiction of a loss and are not amenable to 
possession: see, however, a critique of the decision in Sarah Green, “To 
Have and to Hold? Conversion and Intangible Property” (2008) 
71(1) MLR 114 at 114–131 (that intangibles can be the subject of 
conversion if they meet the criteria of “exclusivity” in terms of control 
over the asset in question and “exhaustivity” in depriving the rightful 
owners substantially of the value of the assets); and Lee Pey Woan, 
“Inducing Breach of Contract, Conversion and Contract As Property” 
(2009) 29(3) OxJLS 511 at 530. It should also be highlighted that in 
OBG Ltd v Allan, the House of Lords was not specifically dealing with 
the conversion of confidential information which may be regarded as sui 
generis. 
26.17 The High Court in Simgood Pte Ltd v MLC Shipbuilding Sdn 
Bhd [2016] 1 SLR 1129 (“Simgood”) considered that a contractual right 
to immediate possession of a vessel can give rise to a standing to sue in 
conversion against the defendants who had changed the vessel hull 
number. This was based on the case of Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran v The Barakat Galleries Ltd [2009] QB 22 at [30] in 
which Lord Phillips stated: 
Where the owner of goods with an immediate right to possession of 
them by contract transfers the latter right to another, so that he no 
longer has an immediate right to possession, but retains ownership, it 
would seem right in principle that the transferee should be entitled to 
sue in conversion. 
In so holding, Vinodh Coomaraswamy J doubted the decision in Jarvis v 
Williams [1955] 1 WLR 71 to the extent that it has been taken to stand 
for the proposition that a mere contractual right to possession cannot 
amount to a right to sue in conversion. However, under the contract, the 
plaintiff could only exercise a right to delivery and to take possession of 
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the vessel when it was completed and the plaintiff had fulfilled all its 
payment obligations. As the plaintiff had not completed its instalment 
payments at the time of the alleged act of conversion, the plaintiff could 
not sue in conversion. 
26.18 With respect to the claim in detinue, a demand made by the 
plaintiff for the goods in the wrongful possession of the defendant is a 
prerequisite to establish the tort: see Clayton v Le Roy [1911] 2 KB 1031 
and General and Finance Facilities Ltd v Cooks Cars (Romford) Ltd 
[1963] 1 WLR 644 at 648–649. In Simgood, it was held that a letter of 
demand for the delivery of the vessel, served by the plaintiff on a 
shareholder of the defendant in possession of the vessel, constitutes 
sufficient notice to the defendant if the latter would thereby be put on 
notice that the vessel in its possession was the subject matter of the 
demand by the plaintiff. Given the rationales of the notice requirement 
which were to determine the point at which the claim in detinue arose 
and fairness to the defendant so as to give the latter reasonable time to 
make the goods ready for delivery (Simgood at [163]), the fact that the 
demand was communicated to a third party instead of the defendant 
should not automatically preclude satisfaction of the notice 
requirement. Further, there was evidence in the present case that the 
defendant had issued a letter in response to the above-mentioned letter 
of demand from the plaintiff. Notwithstanding the notice, the defendant 
failed to deliver the vessel to the plaintiff and was thus liable for 
damages for the wrongful retention of the vessel. 
Deceit 
26.19 The interesting question of whether market manipulation 
conduct can amount to a claim in deceit was explored in TMT Asia Ltd v 
BHP Billiton Marketing AG (Singapore Branch) [2015] 2 SLR 540 (“TMT 
Asia”). This case concerned forward freight agreements (“FFAs”) which 
were traded over the counter. The plaintiff company, which purchased 
various FFAs based on an index, alleged that it suffered losses due to the 
conduct of the defendants, a group of companies, in manipulating the 
market for FFAs by procuring contracts for fixtures of certain vessels, 
thereby causing freight rates on the above-mentioned index to rise 
sharply. Given the defendants’ application to strike out the claim and the 
plaintiff ’s subsequent application to amend the statement of claim to 
clarify the claim in the tort of deceit and market manipulation, Judith 
Prakash J noted that the threshold was a low one as to whether the 
plaintiff ’s amended claim in deceit raised some issue to be decided at 
trial: at [41], citing Gabriel Peter & Partners v Wee Chong Jin [1997]  
3 SLR(R) 649. The learned judge was of the view that the elements of 
deceit (namely, representation of fact; intention that the representation 
would be acted upon by the plaintiff; the plaintiff acted upon the false 
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statement; the plaintiff suffered damage as a result; and the 
representation was made with knowledge that it was false, was wilfully 
false or at least made in the absence of any genuine belief that it was 
true: see Panatron Pte Ltd v Lee Cheow Lee [2001] 2 SLR(R) 435 at [14]) 
were present in this case. 
26.20 Two elements of deceit, namely, representation of fact and 
reliance, were specifically mentioned by Prakash J. First, Salaman v 
Warner (1891) 65 LT 132 – which involved the defendants’ alleged 
purchase of certain shares as a step in the conspiracy rather than as part 
of the claim in deceit – did not show that market manipulation conduct 
could never amount to a representation of fact. The artificially inflated 
prices could amount to a representation of fact that the price was 
naturally high. The question whether the defendant intended, by 
procuring the contracts for fixtures of the vessels, for the artificially high 
prices to be reported or whether the high prices were incidental to their 
conduct was a matter to be decided at the trial. It is true that generally 
speaking, the defendant’s conduct can constitute a representation and 
the representation need not be communicated directly to the plaintiff. 
Whether the artificially inflated prices constituted a misrepresentation 
was less straightforward. An alternative argument, depending on the 
facts to be adduced at trial, could be that the artificially inflated prices 
were a consequence of the defendants’ alleged market manipulation 
conduct rather than a representation in itself. 
26.21 With respect to the reliance requirement, the plaintiff pleaded 
that the defendants’ market manipulation conduct compelled it to close 
out and/or change its positions on the FFAs it held. As such, there was 
no specific reliance on the defendants’ market manipulation conduct 
pleaded by the plaintiff. Notwithstanding this, the learned judge refused 
to strike out the claim. Prakash J appeared to have suggested that 
specific reliance on the defendants’ market manipulation conduct might 
not be necessary under the tort though her Honour also indicated that 
the plaintiff would have an “uphill task” at trial: TMT Asia at [54]. Thus, 
this decision in itself does not indicate, by any means, that market 
manipulation conduct is likely to constitute a tortious act. In this regard, 
it should also be noted that Prakash J had rejected an argument by the 
plaintiff that there should be a tort of market manipulation given the 
current regulatory framework under the Securities and Futures Act 
(Cap 289, 2006 Rev Ed) and economic policy in this area. 
26.22 The case of Tembusu Growth Fund Ltd v ACTAtek, Inc [2015] 
SGHC 206 briefly discusses the plaintiff ’s claims in fraudulent 
misrepresentation (including the element of representation of fact based 
on the defendants’ statements of current intention in Edgington v 
Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459) and inducement of breach of contract 
(in particular, the principle in Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497 on a 
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director’s liability in inducing a breach of contract by the company). The 
defendant’s counterclaims in negligence and conspiracy by unlawful 
means failed. Haneda Construction & Machinery Pte Ltd v Huttons Asia 
Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 294 concerned certain alleged representations by a 
property agent (second defendant) to the purchasers of warehouse units 
(plaintiffs) in a commercial warehouse development that there were 
ready sub-purchasers for the units. The claim in deceit failed as there 
was no proof that the second defendant had made those alleged 
representations. In any event, as there was no evidence of an employer-
employee relationship between the first and second defendants, the first 
defendant could not be vicariously liable. 
Defamation 
Defamatory meaning, identification of plaintiff and corporation’s 
claim for damages 
26.23 In Golden Season Pte Ltd v Kairos Singapore Holdings Pte Ltd 
[2015] 2 SLR 751 (“Golden Season”), the third plaintiff was the director 
of both the first and second plaintiff companies. The second defendant 
was the director of the first defendant, a company which provided, 
amongst others, inflatable boats and marine products for flood disaster 
relief work. The first plaintiff purchased inflatable boats and other 
related equipment from the first defendant for the purpose of donations 
in aid of the floods in Thailand in 2011. The defendants also donated 
boats and related equipment, which were sent to and acknowledged by 
Mercy Relief, but the plaintiffs did not inform the defendants about this. 
The defendants made various statements via Facebook, e-mails and 
Short Message Service (“SMS”) messages imputing that the plaintiffs 
were dishonest for selling the inflatable boats to Mercy Relief at a profit, 
overcharging and improper use of donors’ moneys. This case involved 
the legal requirements of establishing defamatory meaning, reference to 
the plaintiff, defences, and the corporations’ entitlement to awards of 
general and special damages. However, the High Court ruled that no 
aggravated damages should be awarded to corporate plaintiffs. 
26.24 On the issue of defamatory meaning, a statement that alleges 
that a complaint or report has been made against the plaintiff to the 
police is not necessarily defamatory. The SMS text messages sent by the 
second defendant to a third party stated that a police report had been 
made against the third plaintiff, and that a defamation suit had been 
brought by the third plaintiff followed by the request that the recipient 
of the SMS texts “be truthful and not be afraid” and that “come what 
may, the truth will be out abt [sic] [the third plaintiff] and the way he do 
[sic] his business”: at [82]. According to George Wei JC, the statement 
only conveyed to the reasonable reader that a serious legal dispute 
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between the plaintiff and defendant had arisen out of business dealings 
and did not impute that the third plaintiff was “guilty of an offence or 
that there are good grounds to think that an offence had been 
committed”: at [82]. These gradations of meaning were referred to in 
Chase v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd [2003] EMLR 2178 at [45] (applied 
in Ng Koo Kay Benedict v Zim Integrated Shipping Services Ltd [2010] 
2 SLR 860 and Low Tuck Kwong v Sukamto Sia [2014] 1 SLR 639 
(“Low Tuck Kwong”) as levels 1 and 3 meanings respectively). The High 
Court decision serves as a reminder that defamatory meaning is 
assessed from the view of an ordinary reasonable reader and not one 
who is prejudiced in coming to a conclusion that reflects adversely on 
the plaintiff: Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Harrison (1982) 149 CLR 293 
at 300–301. 
26.25 Moving on to the next legal element, the High Court decided 
that the plaintiff ’s act in identifying himself as the person being referred 
to in the defendants’ defamatory posting could not, on its own, satisfy 
the requirement of reference to the plaintiff. Logically, the source of 
identification of the plaintiff should be the defendants’ publication 
rather than the plaintiff himself. In this case, however, the second 
defendant, when he responded to the third plaintiff ’s comment on 
Facebook, had confirmed the plaintiff ’s identity. This response of the 
defendant was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of reference to 
plaintiff. The High Court reached this conclusion based on a novel 
interpretation of the Facebook postings and threads of comments in the 
context of Singapore defamation law. Here the content of the postings 
changes as threads of comments were added. The Facebook posting and 
the accompanying thread of comments were akin to a “conversation” 
building upon previous threads: see Smith v ADVFN plc [2008] 
EWHC 1797 at [14] and Baglow v Smith 2011 ONSC 5131 at [59] 
and [60]. As such, this “conversation” constituted a “single publication” 
in so far as the subsequent comments belong to a single thread of 
comments originating from the same post: see McGrath v Dawkins 
[2012] EWHC B3 at [53]. 
26.26 Nonetheless, there is a general rule in Grappelli v Derek Block 
(Holdings) Pte Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 822 (“Grappelli”) at 825, per 
Lord Denning, against using inferences placed upon statements after the 
publication by facts subsequently learnt. The High Court in 
Golden Season ruled, relying on Grappelli, that there was no reference to 
the plaintiff in the first Facebook posting by recourse to a subsequent 
posting. 
26.27 The e-mail communications were defamatory in imputing that 
the plaintiffs were dishonest, cheats and in a position of conflict of 
interests. Wei JC awarded the first plaintiff $15,000 for the injury done 
to its business reputation and, for the third plaintiff, $30,000 by way of 
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general damages for the injury to his reputation and the consequential 
injury to his feelings and dignity. No special damages were awarded as 
the plaintiff could not prove that the decrease in the first plaintiff ’s sales 
was attributable to the defamatory e-mails. Instead, Mercy Relief and 
Singapore Red Cross had chosen to stop ordering from the plaintiffs 
because of complications arising from the litigation and the 
deterioration of ties between the plaintiffs and the defendants: see 
Low Tuck Kwong (above, para 26.24). As mentioned above, one question 
is whether corporations should be awarded aggravated damages. This 
issue was earlier raised in Basil Anthony Herman v Premier Security 
Co-operative Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 110 but not fully determined. Wei JC 
explained that Messenger Newspapers Group Ltd v National Graphical 
Association [1984] 1 All ER 293 (“Messenger Newspapers Group”), which 
purportedly awarded aggravated damages to a corporate plaintiff, can be 
distinguished as it was based on the need to punish the defendant for his 
deliberate wrongdoing instead of compensating for injury to feelings. 
This legal position was subsequently echoed by Lee Seiu Kin J in ATU v 
ATY [2015] 4 SLR 1159 which followed foreign decisions from 
Hong Kong (Oriental Daily Publisher Ltd; Ma Ching Kwan v (1) Ming 
Pao Holdings; (2) Ming Pao Newspaper Ltd; and (3) Cheung Kin Bor 
[2013] EMLR 7) and England (Collins Stewart Ltd v The Financial Times 
Ltd [2006] EMLR 5; Eaton Mansions (Westminster) Ltd v Stinger 
Compania de Inversion SA [2014] HLR 4 (“Eaton Mansions”)). The last 
case had specifically stated that Messenger Newspapers Group was 
“wrongly decided”: Eaton Mansions at [30]. 
Examining factors in assessment of damages 
26.28 Lee J in ATU v ATY also examined the relevant factors for 
assessing damages in defamation including the nature and gravity of the 
defamatory statement, the mode and extent of publication, the standing 
of the parties and the deterrent effect of a damages award. The 
allegations by the defendant were certainly grave as they concerned the 
sexual abuse and assaults of young children under the care of the 
plaintiffs, an international school, and its principal, school 
administrator and one of the teachers’ aides, as well as the systemic 
abuse of trust. The first three plaintiffs enjoyed a high standing in the 
international school community. There was also extensive republication 
of the allegations via media outlets as the defendant had intentionally 
communicated the statements to the press which the public had great 
interest in knowing and the press were “almost bound to repeat” them 
(at [41]). Liability for republication will arise where the publisher had 
intended it or when it was a foreseeable consequence: Goh Chok Tong v 
Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin [1997] 3 SLR(R) 46 at [129]–[130], per 
Rajendran J; McManus v Beckham [2002] 1 WLR 2982. There is a subtle 
(but nonetheless, important) difference between the “natural and 
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probable consequence” test in Low Tuck Kwong v Sukamto Sia [2013] 
1 SLR 1016 and that of “foreseeable consequence” in ATU v ATY. The 
latter test, which is to be assessed by putting the reasonable man in the 
shoes of the defendant, is arguably a more fitting response to the 
question of whether the defendant should be regarded in law as the 
party responsible for the act of republication by another person. Save for 
the first plaintiff, a corporate entity, the second to fourth plaintiffs were 
awarded aggravated damages for the defendant’s recklessness as to the 
truth of the allegations and her failure to apologise or retract her 
defamatory statements. Special damages were, however, not recoverable 
as the loss allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs was not referable to the 
damage to reputation: Low Tuck Kwong (above, para 26.24). 
26.29 Lee Hsien Loong v Roy Ngerng Yi Ling [2016] 1 SLR 1321 
concerned assessment of damages after the defendant had been found 
liable for defaming the plaintiff in an article published on the 
defendant’s blog: see Lee Hsien Loong v Roy Ngerng Yi Ling [2014] 
SGHC 230 and discussion in (2014) 15 SAL Ann Rev 502 at 505–506, 
paras 25.13–25.15. With specific regard to the assessment of damages, 
Lee Seiu Kin J in Lee Hsien Loong v Roy Ngerng Yi Ling awarded the 
plaintiff $100,000 in general damages and $50,000 in aggravated 
damages. His Honour referred to the common factors relating to the 
gravity of the accusation, the high standing of the plaintiff and the mode 
and extent of publication as well as one factor which has hitherto not 
been comprehensively examined in Singapore, namely the credibility of 
the defamatory material and the defendant. With respect to the 
credibility issue, the type of Internet platform in which the defamatory 
material was communicated was relevant (eg, bulletin board posts in 
Nigel Smith v ADVFN plc [2008] EWHC 1797). In this regard, Lee J 
noted that the blog was fairly credible as it was written in a 
well-structured and grammatical manner supported by charts and 
statistics from verifiable sources. 
26.30 Whether the defamer was credible was also relevant to the 
assessment of damages (see Oriental Daily Publisher Ltd v Ming Pao 
Holdings Ltd [2012] HKCFA 59 and the Canadian cases of Randall v 
Weich 1982 CarswellBC 2254 and Kohuch v Wilson 71 Sask R 33). With 
respect to what the judge regarded as an insincere apology by the 
defendant for the defamatory postings, his Honour followed the 
position in Adelson v Associated Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [2009] EMLR 10 
at [72]–[74] that “an apology that is not full or frank does not appease 
the feelings of the person defamed and does not undo the harm to the 
claimant’s reputation”. The malice of the defendant based on his 
knowledge of the reach of the defamatory material and the likelihood of 
its republication constituted aggravating factors. An important point to 
note is that although the High Court was prepared to consider the 
proposal made in Review Publishing Co Ltd v Lee Hsien Loong [2010] 
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1 SLR 52 that the quantum of damages payable could be adjusted in 
proportion to the degree of care which the defendant had taken with 
respect to the publication, there was no concrete evidence to support 
such an adjustment in this case. 
Defamatory meaning, defence of consent and qualified privilege 
26.31 The next case discusses two developments in respect of the 
defence of consent and qualified privilege. Ramesh s/o Krishnan v AXA 
Life Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd [2015] 4 SLR 1 (“Ramesh”) was a suit 
against an insurance company, AXA Life Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd 
(“AXA”), for statements made in employment references about an 
ex-agent, Ramesh, who, having resigned due to a dispute with AXA, was 
seeking employment with two other insurance companies. There was in 
place an industry reference check system to facilitate compliance with 
certain guidelines prescribed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(“MAS”). A duty was imposed on financial institutions (“FIs”) such as 
the insurance companies to respond to queries by MAS and reference 
check requests by other FIs in respect of its ex-representatives. Under 
this industry reference check system, FIs were obliged to conduct 
reference checks on applicants (such as the plaintiff) for jobs. He sued in 
defamation for two statements made by AXA to these insurance 
companies and the MAS under the section on “Optional Information”, 
one on persistency ratios, and the other, for compliance. The claims 
were eventually dismissed. 
26.32 The statements on persistency were not defamatory. Referring 
to the test of Sim v Stretch (1936) 52 TLR 669, per Lord Atkin, that 
defamatory meaning be assessed from the perspective of right-thinking 
members of society generally, the High Court held that the statements 
on low persistency ratios would require special knowledge of the 
computation method and industry norms which the ordinary 
reasonable person lacks. An alternative would have been for the plaintiff 
to plead innuendo which was, for reasons unknown, not done. On the 
other hand, the statements on compliance were held to be defamatory 
for they imputed that Ramesh had been investigated in respect of a 
complaint in his work, profession, trade, business and/or services 
provided, and that he was an incompetent manager and supervisor. 
26.33 One defence – not often relied upon – is that of consent. Did 
the plaintiff consent to the defamatory statements made? The standard 
industry reference check form indicated that the plaintiff had given 
written authorisation to AXA to conduct the inquiry into his or her 
previous employment. Drawing upon relevant English and Australian 
precedents, the High Court made important clarifications concerning 
the legal position in Singapore. First and foremost, consent must be 
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clearly and unequivocally given with regard to the fact of publication and 
to the content of the publication: see Carter-Ruck on Libel and Privacy 
(Alastair Mullis & Cameron Doley gen eds) (LexisNexis, 6th Ed, 2010) 
at para 14.56. Under the defence of consent, there is no requirement for 
consent to the specific words in the defamatory statements: Michael 
James Austen v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd and Civil 
Aviation Authority [1993] FCA 403 (“Michael James”). In terms of the 
scope of consent, it was found that Ramesh had consented to AXA’s 
publication to the other insurance companies of all information relevant 
to Ramesh’s reference checks. In addition to the relevance and scope of 
consent, the information must have been honestly and properly kept by 
the defendant: see Michael James; Chapman v Lord Ellesmere [1932] 
2 KB 431; and Friend v Civil Aviation Authority [1998] IRLR 253. This 
last requirement can, as a matter of logic and common sense, be 
supported by the plaintiff ’s (reasonable) expectations that the records 
were to be honestly and properly kept at the relevant time when he 
signed the written authorisation, and that due care would be exercised 
by the defendant in responding to reference checks. 
26.34 Apart from the defence of justification, the High Court opined 
that the defence of qualified privilege would apply in such a case to 
protect the communications made by an ex-employer to a prospective 
employer. This was consonant with the need for the ex-employer’s full 
and frank assessment of its ex-employee: see also the English case of 
Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296 (“Spring”). In addition, 
AXA shared a common interest with the other insurance companies 
under the industry reference check system with reference to the 
communication of Ramesh’s persistency ratios and compliance record. 
The defence of qualified privilege protected the communication to MAS 
as AXA was under a duty to report to the regulator as expressly set out 
in a MAS notification. There was also no malice based on the “dominant 
motive” test as set out by the Court of Appeal in Chan Cheng Wah 
Bernard v Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2012] 1 SLR 506. Since the 
defamation claim failed due to the defence of qualified privilege, this 
raises the interesting issue of whether the plaintiff would be able to avail 
itself of a suit in negligence (see paras 26.67–26.69 below). 
Harassment 
26.35 The Protection from Harassment Act (Cap 256A, 2015 Rev Ed) 
was enacted to deal with social scourges such as harassing conduct, 
stalking, cyberbullying and harassment at the workplaces. Section 15 
deals with publication of false statements of fact about a “person”. Upon 
the application of the “person” (or subject) of such false statements, the 
District Court is empowered to require the publisher to put up a 
notification to “bring attention to the falsehood and the true facts”, 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
(2015) 16 SAL Ann Rev Tort Law 649 
 
provided the court is satisfied that the fact complained of is false in any 
particular about the subject, and it is just and equitable to make the 
order. 
26.36 A dispute had arisen between the Ministry of Defence 
(“MINDEF”) and a Dr Ting about a patent developed by Dr Ting’s 
company (“MobileStats”). This led to a law suit by MobileStats against 
MINDEF for infringement of patent. MINDEF had earlier entered into a 
contract with another company, Syntech, to purchase the medical 
military vehicles. The law suit by MobileStats was discontinued midway 
through trial. Dr Ting subsequently made statements that a MINDEF 
high-ranking officer knew that MINDEF was infringing the patent and 
was attempting to “get around” the patent, and that MINDEF had 
dragged out the litigation to increase MobileStats’s costs. These 
statements were published online by The Online Citizen. MINDEF 
alleged that the statements meant that MINDEF had knowingly 
infringed upon the patent and had deliberately delayed court 
proceedings as a “war of attrition” against MobileStats, which it claimed 
were false. The District Court allowed the s 15 application by the 
Attorney-General: see Attorney-General v Lee Kwai Hou Howard, 
Xu Yuen Chen, Loh Hong Puey Andrew, Choo Zheng Xi, Lee Song Kwang 
and Ting Choon Meng [2015] SGDC 114. 
26.37 This decision was overruled by the High Court in Ting Choon 
Meng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 1248. In essence, See Kee Oon JC 
decided that the Government did not have the right to make a s 15 
application as it was not a “person” under the provision. In any event, 
the statement that MINDEF had knowingly infringed the patent had not 
been shown to be false. (Note: the other statement that MINDEF had 
deliberately delayed court proceedings was false as MINDEF was not in 
fact in charge of the litigation; Syntech had taken over the litigation 
pursuant to the contract terms agreed with MINDEF.) Moreover, it was 
not just and equitable to grant a s 15 order. MINDEF had already 
published online its version of the story; the false statement that 
MINDEF had delayed court proceedings did not seriously impugn 
MINDEF’s identity; and The Online Citizen had already published 
MINDEF’s statement on the matter. 
26.38 Returning to the point that the Government did not have a right 
to apply for the court order under s 15, the thrust of the Protection from 
Harassment Act, according to the learned See JC, was to protect persons 
from the emotional or psychological impact of the words or conduct of 
others. The statute provided for both criminal and civil remedies under 
ss 3, 4 and 7 to victims who have been subject to harassment. This 
interpretation was based on the court’s reading of parliamentary debates 
leading to the enactment of the statute. In the Minister for Law’s speech 
in Parliament, the s 15 remedy was variously described as a “lower tier 
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of remedy”, a form of “self-help” and a “lesser remedy” without the need 
for recourse to criminal and civil law. Hence, the learned judge 
determined that s 15 was to be limited to false statements which are 
capable of affecting the subject emotionally and psychologically which 
meant that the subject had to be a human being. This was 
notwithstanding the fact that s 15 does not refer to “harassment” at all. 
With respect to false statements ostensibly targeted against corporations, 
however, See JC noted it was possible for a human being who managed 
the corporation to make a s 15 application if the allegation was, in 
substance, one against the human being. In so far as the present 
application was concerned, this exception did not apply as it was the 
Government, rather than a Government officer, that sought the court 
order. 
26.39 The upshot of the court’s position is that a corporation cannot 
sue for harassment under the statute. This runs counter to the definition 
of a “person” in s 2 of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 1997 Rev Ed) as 
including “any company or association or body of persons, corporate or 
unincorporate”. The prima facie interpretation must be that a 
corporation, and not merely a human being, should be allowed to apply 
for a s 15 order to correct any false statements concerning the 
corporation. However, the High Court also noted that the meaning 
referred to in the Interpretation Act applies unless “there is something in 
the subject or context inconsistent with such construction” or unless it is 
therein “otherwise expressly provided”. It cited the case of Chee Siok 
Chin v Minister for Home Affairs [2006] 1 SLR(R) 562 at [67] in which 
V K Rajah J (as he then was) stated that, in relation to the predecessor 
provisions to the Protection from Harassment Act (namely the 
Miscellaneous Offence (Public Order and Nuisance Act) (Cap 184, 
1997 Rev Ed), the offences may: 
… when directed against a body (corporate or unincorporated), be 
viewed as constituting harassment and/or causing alarm or distress to 
those responsible for running that body. … [the offences] … can be 
committed, if not against corporate or incorporated bodies as persons, 
then certainly against the persons responsible for operating or 
managing such bodies. 
Inducement of breach of contract 
26.40 In Likpin International Ltd v Swiber Holdings Ltd [2015] 
5 SLR 962, the plaintiff claimed against the first defendant for breach of 
contract and against the second defendant for inducing the breach of 
contract. Both claims were denied. This was because the alleged contract 
between the plaintiff and the first defendant for the charter of a vessel 
was not legally enforceable due to uncertainty in the material terms (the 
date of conclusion of the contract and the agreed consideration). This 
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absence of a properly concluded contract – a basic prerequisite for 
finding inducement of breach of contract – meant that the claim must 
fail. The above decision adds to the existing cases where the tort could 
not be established as the underlying contract had not been formed 
(Otech Pakistan Pvt Ltd v Clough Engineering Ltd [2007] 1 SLR(R) 989) 
or was otherwise void (Stratech Systems Ltd v Nyam Chiu Shin [2005] 
2 SLR(R) 579). Where there is no valid contract or legally enforceable 
contract, there would not be any interference with the contractual rights 
of the plaintiff to begin with. 
26.41 The requirement of finding an intention on the part of the 
defendants regarding the breach of contract was examined in M+W 
Singapore Pte Ltd v Leow Tet Sin [2015] 2 SLR 271 (“M+W Singapore”). 
Jurong Data Centre Development Pte Ltd (“JDD”) engaged the plaintiff 
construction company to build a data centre. As JDD was defaulting on 
its payments, JDD executed a debenture to provide security to the 
plaintiff. It was agreed in the debenture that all monetary claims would 
be charged to the plaintiff by way of a first charge and deposited into an 
account for the plaintiff. Subsequently, investors withdrew from the 
project and JDD could not make repayments. Receivers and managers, 
who were appointed for JDD, found that there were insufficient assets 
belonging to JDD for repayment of the debts owed to the plaintiff. It 
also transpired that the defendants – two directors of JDD and joint 
signatories of the account – had authorised payments of a sum of money 
to third parties from the above-mentioned account. The defendants 
clearly knew of the existence and terms of the debenture. The legal issue 
was whether the defendants intended the breach of contract as an end in 
itself or as a means to an end (OBG Ltd v Allan (above, para 26.16)). 
Here, the High Court took the view that the defendants intended to 
interfere with the plaintiff ’s contractual rights knowingly: at [90], citing 
Tribune Investment Trust Inc v Soosan Trading Co Ltd [2000] 
2 SLR(R) 407 (“Tribune Investment”). The High Court had earlier found 
that, with regard to the plaintiff ’s separate claim, the defendants had 
dishonestly assisted in breach of trust. With their knowledge of the 
terms of the debenture, the defendants had participated in the payment 
of money to third parties in a manner that would offend ordinary 
standards of honest conduct. The defendants could have notified the 
plaintiff and obtained approval before making the unauthorised 
payments to third parties but did not do so. Moreover, an objective 
person would have realised that those payments would be contrary to 
the plaintiff ’s interest in the preservation of the security. 
26.42 Prakash J also decided, albeit “reluctantly”, that the defendants 
did not act bona fide as directors in the interests of JDD. This was a case, 
according to the learned judge, where the directors “act[ed] wrongly 
within the scope of their authority” (as opposed to acting beyond their 
scope of authority): M+W Singapore at [97]. There was also the element 
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of “dishonesty” present in the present case. Hence, the defendants could 
not be protected under the rule in Said v Butt (above, para 26.22). 
26.43 The authors discussed ARS v ART in the context of a conspiracy 
claim (see para 26.11 above). The plaintiff had also claimed that the first 
defendant induced and/or procured two other parties to breach the first 
and second agreements respectively. The High Court stated (at [29]) 
that the plaintiff must show, apart from the act of inducement and the 
breach of the contract, that: (a) the defendant acted with the requisite 
knowledge of the existence of the contract; and (b) the defendant 
intended to interfere with the performance of the contract (as set out by 
the Court of Appeal in Tribune Investment at [17]). The plaintiff could 
not prove that the two agreements existed or, even if they did exist, that 
they were breached. Neither did the first defendant induce the breach 
with the knowledge of the agreements and with the intention to 
interfere with their performance. The plaintiff alleged that certain 
parties who had induced the breach were representatives and/or acting 
for and on behalf of the first defendant. However, those parties were 
neither the employees nor directors of the first defendant but merely 
individuals in the group of companies of which the first defendant was 
the holding company. According to Quentin Loh J, the acts or 
knowledge of those parties could not be attributed to the first defendant. 
Malicious prosecution 
26.44 In Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation 
Strata Title Plan No 301 [2015] SGHC 44, the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendants had committed the tort of malicious prosecution, amongst 
others. The defendants sought to strike out the claim. Choo Han Teck J 
refused to do so, pointing out that the tort of malicious prosecution in 
respect of civil proceedings was not settled law. This issue had been 
dealt with in a recent Privy Council decision in Crawford Adjusters v 
Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd [2013] 3 WLR 927 wherein the 
majority (Lords Sumption JSC and Neuberger PSJ dissenting) took the 
position that the tort existed due to the need to provide remedies for 
harm done to the plaintiff and it was consistent with case precedents: see 
also Tom K C Ng, “The Torts of Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of 
Legal Process” (2014) 130 LQR 43 at 43–47. Conflicting dicta from three 
Singapore High Court decisions – Strategic Worldwide Assets Ltd v 
Sandz Solutions (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 662 at [93]; Lim Kok 
Lian v Lee Patricia [2015] 1 SLR 1184 at [13]; and Bhagwan Singh v 
Chand Singh [1968–1970] SLR(R) 50 at [28] – suggest that this issue is 
yet to be resolved. 
26.45 It should be noted that there is a pending appeal to the UK 
Supreme Court against the decision of the High Court in Willers v Joyce 
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[2015] EWHC 1315 that the claim for malicious prosecution of civil 
proceedings should be struck out. Tipples QC stated that she was bound 
to follow Gregory v Portsmouth City Council [2000] 1 AC 419 
(“Gregory”) in that the tort of malicious prosecution did not extend 
beyond the abuse of criminal proceedings. Tipples QC also granted a 
leapfrog certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Singapore 
courts are clearly not bound by Gregory. In any event, it is open to a 
plaintiff to argue that the ratio in Gregory be confined to the principle 
that the tort of malicious prosecution should not apply to disciplinary 
proceedings by a local authority which is quite distinct from extending 
the tort to civil proceedings generally. 
Negligence 
Wrongful birth and upkeep expenses 
26.46 ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 218 (“ACB”) was 
probably one of the most-discussed cases in Singapore last year. Due to 
the negligence of the defendants, a couple who underwent in-vitro 
fertilisation (“IVF”) treatment had a child that was not biologically the 
offspring of the plaintiff ’s husband. The defendants had negligently used 
the sperm of a third party to fertilise the plaintiff ’s egg. The couple sued 
the defendants to recover the upkeep costs of raising the child. There 
were four defendants. The first defendant was Thomson Medical Pte Ltd 
(the hospital); the second defendant was Thomson Fertility Centre Pte 
Ltd (a clinic owned by the first defendant); and the third and fourth 
defendants respectively were the senior embryologist and chief 
embryologist of the second defendant. All four defendants were sued in 
tort, and the third defendant additionally was sued for breach of 
contract. 
26.47 Choo Han Teck J considered the leading wrongful conception 
cases from the UK, namely McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 
2 AC 59 (“McFarlane”) and from Australia, namely Cattanach v Melchior 
(2003) 215 CLR 1 (“Cattanach”). The House of Lords in McFarlane by 
4:1 majority denied the claim largely on moral grounds, whereas the 
High Court of Australia in Cattanach allowed it. Choo J expressed a 
preference for the McFarlane approach, arguing that it would be 
immoral and repugnant to award such damages as it would make the 
child believe that he or she had been unwanted at birth. 
26.48 Choo J also recognised that the facts of ACB were unique. 
Unlike McFarlane and Cattanach, where the parents had not wanted 
another child and therefore may not have been prepared for the upkeep 
expenses, the parents in ACB had wanted a child and had prepared for 
the upkeep expenses. Thus, on conventional tort principles, there was 
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no loss. Choo J, however, did not go on to consider whether a claim in 
contract should have been allowed. This case was appealed and heard by 
a bench of five judges in the Court of Appeal, whose decision is 
pending. For a full discussion of the High Court decision, see Margaret 
Fordham, “An IVF Baby and a Catastrophic Error – Actions for 
Wrongful Conception and Wrongful Birth Revisited in Singapore” 
[2015] Sing JLS 232. 
No duty to prevent bullying? 
26.49 AYW v AYX [2016] 1 SLR 1183 involved a striking out 
application in an action by a student victim of bullying against her 
school for failing to prevent the bullying by other students. George Wei J 
noted that schools clearly owed a duty of care to their students to 
provide a safe and secure environment for learning. However, he struck 
out the claim on the ground that it was factually and legally 
unsustainable. The facts briefly were that the plaintiff was a member of 
the school’s Chinese orchestra, including being on its executive 
committee. Disputes arose amongst the students, resulting in the other 
students ostracising the plaintiff. The plaintiff ’s parents intervened and 
after a period of unsatisfactory interactions with the school, the plaintiff 
withdrew from the school and went to the UK to complete her studies. 
26.50 Wei J, noting that the case raised some novel questions of law, 
cautioned that novel questions of law should ordinarily not be resolved 
at the striking out stage. However, he also noted that there was no rule 
preventing a court striking out an action despite the presence of novel 
questions of law if the facts do not support even a remote likelihood of 
success were the claim to proceed. Wei J then undertook an in-depth 
analysis of the duty of care concept, in particular the coterminous area 
of duty and breach, often described as the scope of duty question. 
26.51 Focusing on the scope of duty question, Wei J held that while 
the school clearly owed a general duty to its students, that duty did not 
extend to policing all students’ activities that could harm other students. 
On the facts, the scope of duty contended for by the plaintiff was 
unsupported. While Wei J’s duty of care analysis is detailed and 
sophisticated, it is questionable whether the claim should have been 
struck out given that it did raise novel legal questions, and it required 
fairly detailed analysis to determine the scope of duty. Wei J’s 
interpretation of Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & 
Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100 (“Spandeck”) also reopens the 
hoary question of what is meant by foreseeability. Factually, it is 
foreseeable that bullying could cause the victim physical or psychiatric 
harm. Whether it was reasonably foreseeable is a normative question 
which should have been left to be determined at trial. 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
(2015) 16 SAL Ann Rev Tort Law 655 
 
Representations and proportionate liability 
26.52 The facts in Cheng William v Allister Lim & Thrumurgan [2015] 
1 SLR 201 were that a businessman, Su, paid $900,000 for a shophouse 
believing it had a remaining lease of 62 years, when in fact it had only 
17 years left. Cheng, the vendor, had fraudulently represented the 
remaining lease, resulting in Su’s property agent, Ng, making a negligent 
representation to Su. Su brought an action against Cheng for fraudulent 
misrepresentation, against Ng for negligent misrepresentation and 
against Su’s solicitor in negligence for failing to inform Su of the actual 
remaining lease. The High Court found in favour of Su against all the 
defendants and apportioned liability as follows: Cheng to bear 50%; the 
solicitor to bear 45%; and Ng to bear 5%. Cheng and the solicitor 
appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
26.53 The Court of Appeal held that the High Court had rightly found 
in favour of Su against the three parties, but varied the proportion of 
damages. The court apportioned 65% of the blame to Cheng, 30% to the 
solicitor and 5% to Ng. The greater proportion attributed to Cheng was 
to reflect his greater culpability by way of fraud compared to the 
solicitor’s liability in negligence. The Court of Appeal also found Su 
contributorily negligent in failing to inform his solicitor that he was 
acting under the impression that there were 62 years left on the lease. 
While it would be unusual for a client to be contributorily negligent, in 
cases where the information was pertinent, as it was here, a finding of 
contributory negligence could be made. The court apportioned Su’s 
blame at 15%. 
Duties of occupier and employer 
26.54 Kang See Wha v Pledge Protection (Asia) Pte Ltd [2015] 
SGDC 50 (“Kang See Wha”) concerned an explosion at a condominium 
which caused injuries to several individuals, three of whom initiated 
legal action relying on the torts of negligence and breach of statutory 
duty. The first plaintiff was Kang, a security guard deployed to work at 
the condominium. He sued the first defendant, his employer Pledge 
Protection Asia (“PPA”); the second defendant, the management 
corporation of the condominium (“the MCST”); and the third 
defendant, Property Facility Services Pte Ltd (“PFS”), a property 
management firm appointed to manage the condominium. The second 
plaintiff was Goh, a property officer, who sued his employer (PFS) and 
the MCST. The third plaintiff, Chung, was delivering some equipment 
to the condominium, and he sued the MCST. 
26.55 The explosion was caused by a gas leak. In the days leading up 
to it, residents had complained about the smell, but Kang did not take 
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action initially. He then informed Goh, and finally on the day of the 
explosion the duo went down to the main distribution frame room 
(“MDF room”) on the ground floor of the car park to investigate the 
smell. As the room smelt strongly of gas, they decided to leave 
immediately. Goh’s act of switching off the lights caused a small 
electrical spark which ignited the gas. 
26.56 The actions in negligence by Kang and Goh against the MCST 
were dismissed as the threshold requirement of foreseeability was not 
met. The MCST was not informed about the gas smell and had no 
knowledge of the gas leak until the explosion occurred. Thus, it could 
not have foreseen any risk relating to the explosion. Chung’s claim 
against the MCST was in negligence, alleging that the MCST as occupier 
had breached its duty to lawful entrants by failing to have in place a 
system of inspection to discover gas leaks; by failing to have clear 
protocols for gas leak complaints; and for failing to prevent entry when 
the MCST knew or ought to have known of the gas leak. 
26.57 District Judge Tan May Tee noted that the law on occupiers’ 
liability in Singapore had been subsumed within the general principles 
of negligence in the landmark case of See Toh Siew Kee v Ho Ah Lam 
Ferrocement (Pte) Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 284 (“See Toh”). District Judge Tan 
noted the diverse opinions in See Toh on the application of the Spandeck 
test to lawful and unlawful entrants. District Judge Tan further noted 
that V K Rajah JA’s view that a prima facie duty would be owed to lawful 
entrants was strictly obiter as the plaintiff in See Toh was a trespasser. As 
this case involved a lawful entrant, District Judge Tan held that he had to 
determine whether to follow Rajah JA’s dictum or Sundaresh 
Menon CJ’s, the latter suggesting that Spandeck should be applied to all 
entrants. Preferring Menon CJ’s view, District Judge Tan decided to 
apply Spandeck to determine whether a duty was owed. 
26.58 In doing so, District Judge Tan referred extensively to Chu Said 
Thong v Vision Law LLC [2014] SGHC 160 where Vinodh 
Coomaraswamy J reinterpreted Spandeck to reintroduce a normative, 
reasonable foreseeability test to the threshold stage. District Judge Tan’s 
conclusion in denying a duty is worth quoting (Kang See Wha at [84]): 
A property owner with a reasonable attitude to risk and a reasonable 
capacity for foresight could not have foreseen a gas accident taking 
place at such a location. To determine otherwise would be tantamount 
to making provision for risks which would be regarded as beyond 
reasonable contemplation and might even be consider as fanciful. 
On Kang’s negligence claim against his employer, PPA, 
District Judge Tan held that a duty was clearly owed by an employer to 
its employee to maintain a safe place of work. However, 
District Judge Tan held that PPA had not breached its duty as the 
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explosion was caused by an underground gas leak that was wholly out of 
its management and control. Kang also sued PFS alleging that it was 
vicariously liable for the actions of Goh and that it had breached its duty 
owed to Kang by failing to give Goh proper training on how to handle 
emergencies such as gas leaks. District Judge Tan found in favour of 
Kang on both claims, holding that PFS owed a duty which it had 
breached by failing to have proper protocols, and that it was vicariously 
liable for the tort of its employee, Goh (discussed at para 26.59 below). 
District Judge Tan found Kang to be 50% contributorily negligent in 
failing to act with greater responsiveness to residents’ complaints about 
the smell of gas and in failing to take reasonable care by blindly 
following Goh to the MDF room. 
26.59 Goh sued his employer in negligence and breach of statutory 
duty. District Judge Tan, referring to the employer’s duty of care in 
Chandran a/l Subbiah v Dockers Marine Pte Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 786 
(“Chandran”) found that as it was not foreseeable that the gas pipes 
presented any danger, PSF had not breached its duty to provide a safe 
place of work. However, PSF was found negligent in failing to have in 
place proper protocols to deal with emergency situations, and as such 
had failed to provide a safe system of work. Goh was found 50% 
contributorily negligent. The breach of statutory duty claim also failed. 
Duties of lawyers 
26.60 The judgment in Nava Bharat (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Straits Law 
Practice LLC [2015] SGHC 146 (“Nava Bharat”), running to a 
massive 573 paragraphs, involved a lawsuit by the plaintiff company 
against its lawyer (“Rajaram”); a law firm, Straits Law Practice LLC 
(“SLP”); a businessman (“Dicky Tan”); and his lawyer (“Chandra”). The 
facts were that the plaintiff attempted to acquire an interest in an 
Indonesian coal mine. According to Indonesian law, the plaintiff had to 
work through an Indonesian company. Dicky Tan was the majority 
shareholder of an Indonesian company, PT Indoasia Cemerlang 
(“PTIC”), which had a mining concession. Lengthy negotiations ensued, 
resulting in complex corporate arrangements to facilitate the 
investment. Nava Bharat (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Nava Bharat”), Dicky Tan 
and PTIC incorporated a holding company in which Nava Bharat had 
a 15% interest and the right to acquire up to 90% of the equity. The 
holding company would operate the mine with PTIC. 
26.61 During this process, Indonesia’s mining law changed, which had 
an impact on the proposed transaction as it required a new type of 
licence. Nava Bharat was concerned about this but accepted Dicky Tan’s 
assurance that he would obtain the licence if it was required. There were 
several delays with default notices issued by Nava Bharat and variations 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
658 SAL Annual Review (2015) 16 SAL Ann Rev 
 
made to the agreement to keep the deal alive. At some point, Nava 
Bharat was informed that due to legal complications in Indonesia, Dicky 
Tan had lost his interest in PTIC shares, which had been transferred to 
other parties. It also emerged that Dicky Tan had dealings with other 
companies that were potentially in conflict with his dealing with Nava 
Bharat, or at least which ought to have been disclosed. 
26.62 The claim against Rajaram and SLP was both in contract and 
the tort of negligence. Lee Seiu Kin J, referring to Anwar Patrick 
Adrian v Ng Chong & Hue LLC [2014] 3 SLR 761 (“Anwar”), began by 
noting that a solicitor could owe concurrent duties in contract and tort, 
and that the scope of the duty would be determined by the retainer and 
the work undertaken by the solicitor. Lee J went on to recognise that the 
scope of the duty was also shaped by the expertise of the client – 
a greater duty would generally be owed to a more sophisticated business 
client than an uninformed layperson. Here, the client was found to be a 
sophisticated business; thus, the scope of duty was narrower than that 
owed to a layperson. 
26.63 The crux of the plaintiff ’s claim was Rajaram’s alleged failure to 
advise on the effect of the changes in Indonesian law, but Lee J held that 
such advice was not within the scope of Rajaram’s duty as he was not an 
expert on Indonesian law and had not purported to advise on 
Indonesian law. Lee J also observed that there was no general rule that a 
lawyer engaging in transnational work was obliged to advise on foreign 
law in all cases, especially where foreign legal experts could be engaged 
and relied upon. Similarly, relying on Su Ah Tee v Allister Lim and 
Thrumurgan [2014] SGHC 159, Lee J noted that a solicitor was only 
obliged to advise on legal matters and not on commercial matters. On 
the facts, Lee J found that Rajaram had discharged his legal duties in 
advising the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff ’s decision to go ahead and 
take the risk in proceeding with the investment was a commercial 
decision of the plaintiff. Lee J went on to note that even if Rajaram had 
been negligent, the plaintiff had failed to prove that the negligence was 
causative of the loss as there was no evidence that it would not have 
proceeded as it did but for Rajaram’s alleged failure to advise. 
26.64 The plaintiff ’s claim against Chandra was in unlawful means 
conspiracy (discussed para 26.66 below) and negligence. The negligence 
issue raised an interesting point of whether a solicitor could be found to 
owe a duty of care to a counterparty in a transaction. This was unlike 
Anwar or Cheo Yeoh & Associates LLC v AEL [2015] 4 SLR 325 (“AEL”), 
where the third party to whom a duty was owed was not a counterparty; 
hence, these cases were inapplicable. In these cases, there was a 
commonality of interest between the solicitor’s client and the third party, 
unlike the counterparty cases where the interests of the client and the 
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third party are diametrically opposed. Referring to relevant English and 
Singapore jurisprudence, Lee J held (Nava Bharat at [521]): 
Having considered the above authorities, and bearing in mind the 
universal two-stage test laid down by the Court of Appeal in Spandeck, 
I am of the view that the commonality of interests between the client 
of the lawyer and the third party in question is not per se a 
determinative factor as to whether there is sufficient proximity 
between the lawyer to the third party for the imposition of a duty of 
care. However, the fact that there is a conflict of interest between the 
client and the third party, especially in cases where they are on 
opposite sides of a transaction, would generally indicate a lack of 
proximity. This is because in cases where the client and the third party 
are on opposite sides of the transaction (in the sense that their interest 
may conflict), it would ordinarily be difficult to find that there has 
been voluntarily [sic] assumption of responsibility and reliance or 
control and vulnerability such as to satisfy the proximity limb of the 
Spandeck test. 
26.65 On the facts, there was clearly insufficient proximity between 
Chandra and the plaintiff to establish a duty of care. Chandra had not 
assumed responsibility, nor was he in control of the source of the risk; 
the plaintiff neither relied on Chandra nor was particularly vulnerable. 
It was a well-resourced entity that had its own legal advisers, and 
Chandra was entitled to expect the plaintiff to rely on its own legal 
advisers to protect its interest in the transaction. Interestingly, Lee J 
distinguished between policy considerations, which constituted the 
second limb of the Spandeck test, and consideration of fairness and 
justice, which belonged to the first limb of the test, namely proximity. 
The main policy consideration here was the risk of indeterminate 
liability if the duty of the solicitor were to extend to any third party that 
had an interest in the transaction. 
26.66 On the unlawful conspiracy claim, Lee J began by setting out 
the requirements affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Marinteknik 
(above, para 26.9). On the first element of a combination between two 
or more parties, Lee J held that mere knowledge of the commission of 
an unlawful act was not sufficient to show an agreement or 
combination. On the facts, there was no evidence of an agreement to 
defraud, and Lee J found that Chandra was not aware of the fraud 
pertaining to the PTIC shares. 
Duty of care and employment references 
26.67 Ramesh (above, para 26.31) is a significant case as it represents 
the first instance of an employee suing an ex-employer for a negligently 
prepared reference. Such a claim was first recognised in the English 
decision of Spring (above, para 26.34). The defendant, AXA, provided a 
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reference for the plaintiff as required under the MAS’s regulatory regime 
for representatives of financial institutions (see facts in para 26.31 
above). As mentioned, the reference was negative and the plaintiff 
brought actions in defamation, malicious falsehood and negligence. This 
part deals with the negligence action. 
26.68 Wei J began by stating that Spring, while not applicable as an 
authority, was useful in terms of guiding the court as to the relevant 
considerations in this area. The approach that was binding was that of 
Spandeck. Applying the Spandeck test, Wei J found that a duty of care 
was established. It was clearly foreseeable that the plaintiff could suffer 
loss as a result of the defendant’s actions. There was a relationship of 
proximity, based on the classic factors of special knowledge, assumption 
of responsibility and reasonable reliance. There was no actual reliance in 
this case, but merely general reliance, or perhaps more accurately as 
Wei J noted, there was an expectation that the defendant would exercise 
reasonable care with respect to the plaintiff: for an expectation-based 
theory of negligence, see Kumaralingam Amirthalingam “The Shifting 
Sands of Negligence: Reasonable Reliance to Legitimate Expectation?” 
(2003) 3 OUCLJ 81. 
26.69 The main policy considerations included the potential conflict 
between liability in negligence and the law of defamation and malicious 
falsehood, as well as the need for full and frank disclosure by 
ex-employers in employment references. Neither of these 
considerations, in Wei J’s view, militated against finding a duty of care. 
Although there was a duty of care on the facts, Wei J found that it had 
not been breached; thus, the negligence action failed. 
Others 
26.70 In Tan Shiang Kok (facts set out at para 26.1 above under the 
“Breach of statutory duty” heading), District Judge Koh Juay Kherng 
found the first defendant to have breached its duty of care as the cleaner 
had failed to clean the floor properly and place a warning sign. The 
second defendant was negligent in failing to supervise the first 
defendant and ensure that the cleaning was done properly. 
District Judge Koh also found that the second defendant had breached 
the statutory duty but there was no discussion as to whether the tort of 
breach of statutory duty was made out (see para 26.2 above); liability 
appeared to be on the basis of negligence only. The plaintiff was held to 
be 70% contributorily negligent as he was familiar with the toilet and 
had himself been an experienced toilet cleaner. The first defendant was 
held 20% liable and the second defendant 10%. 
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26.71 In Union Concept Manfacturers Pte Ltd v Rhythme Technology 
Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 121, a lit cigarette fell on packing material outside 
a warehouse, igniting the material which damaged the warehouse. The 
defendant was a company engaged by the Housing and Development 
Board to service and maintain the fire protection and ventilation 
system, including the fire hose reel. The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant was negligent in failing to ensure that there was sufficient 
water in the fire hose reel system, as a result of which the fire could not 
be contained. Choo Han Teck J found that the defendant owed the 
plaintiff a duty of care but on the facts found that the defendant had not 
breached its duty. Further, Choo J held that even if the defendant had 
been negligent, the plaintiff would have failed on causation. The fire had 
spread so rapidly and fiercely that even if there had been sufficient water 
in the hose reel, the fire would not have been contained. 
26.72 Arnold William v Tanoto Shipyard Pte Ltd [2015] SGDC 221 
involved an accident at work when a diver was injured by a floater due 
to the negligence of the defendant. The case was purely factual with the 
defendant found liable in negligence and the plaintiff found to be 
contributorily negligent in equal measure. 
Road traffic accidents 
No estoppel on denial of liability 
26.73 Soh Lay Lian Cherlyn v Kok Mui Eng [2015] 5 SLR 53 involved a 
collision between two vehicles at a traffic intersection. The defendant 
had earlier sued the plaintiff and settled on the basis of 90% liability on 
the plaintiff and 10% liability on the defendant for the accident. The 
plaintiff then instituted this action against the defendant and the 
District Judge felt bound by the ruling in Jaidin bin Jaiman v 
Loganathan a/l Karpaya [2013] 1 SLR 318, holding that the consent final 
judgment bound the defendant and therefore had to be held 10% liable. 
On appeal, Lai Siu Chiu SJ held that the defendant was not estopped 
from denying liability as there had not been a judgment on the merits 
but merely a consent settlement entered into on a “without prejudice” 
basis and without any admission of liability. On the facts, Lai SJ found 
the defendant not liable, holding that the plaintiff was 100% to blame. 
Assessing damages for personal injuries 
26.74 Mark Amaraganthan Selvaganthan v Cheung Man Wai [2015] 
SGHC 253 involved a motor collision between two cars. The plaintiff 
had stopped his car at a traffic junction waiting for an opportunity to 
turn when the defendant collided with the rear of his car. The defendant, 
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noting that the traffic was clear, had assumed that the plaintiff would 
have moved. The defendant also alleged that the plaintiff had actually 
moved and stopped suddenly, which had contributed to the accident. 
Judith Prakash J did not accept this contention and found the defendant 
100% liable. 
26.75 The plaintiff claimed that he suffered a flexion-extension injury 
to his neck which resulted in cervical prolapse. Based on the evidence, 
Prakash J found that the accident had not caused the spinal injury as 
alleged by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed significant damages for 
pain and suffering, loss of future earnings, lost earning capacity, medical 
expenses and transportation costs. In particular, the claim for lost 
earning capacity was $150,000 and loss of earnings as a result of loss of 
promotion opportunities and bonuses was $471,466.65. This head of 
claim was dismissed as the evidence was speculative and indeed, there 
was evidence that the plaintiff had continued to receive bonuses. In the 
end, the plaintiff was awarded $7,000 for pain and suffering, and $4,950 
for medical expenses. 
Cases on contributory negligence 
26.76 Li Gaiyun suing as the administrator of the estate of Ma Dewu, 
deceased v Chan Wei Lun Allan [2015] SGDC 53 was a claim by the 
widow of the deceased who was riding a bicycle when negligently struck 
by the defendant’s car. Briefly, the defendant was driving along a main 
road when the deceased rode out from a side road in front of him. 
District Judge Seah Chi Ling found the defendant negligent for failing to 
keep a proper lookout and reduced the damages by 15% to account for 
the deceased’s contributory negligence. 
26.77 Chai Yew Cian v Yeoh Teow Yee [2015] SGHC 124 involved a 
road traffic accident between a bus, driven by the second defendant, and 
a motorcycle ridden by the first defendant, whose wife was a pillion 
rider and plaintiff in the case. Judith Prakash J found on the facts that 
the first defendant was 85% to blame and the second defendant was 15% 
to blame. 
26.78 Joo Yong Co (Pte) Ltd v Gajentheran Marimuthu [2015] 
SGCA 38 involved a road traffic accident between a lorry driven by the 
defendant and a motorcycle. The issues involved factual inferences to 
determine negligence and contributory negligence. The Court of Appeal 
concluded that the defendant was 85% negligent and the plaintiff 15% 
contributorily negligent, thus varying the trial judge’s finding of 100% 
liability. 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
(2015) 16 SAL Ann Rev Tort Law 663 
 
26.79 In Lyu Yongqiang v Yu Mau Hing [2015] SGHC 200, the plaintiff 
was riding a bicycle when he was side-swiped by a bus driven by the 
defendant. On the facts, Lai Siu Chiu SJ found the defendant 90% liable 
in negligence and the plaintiff 10% contributorily negligent. 
Trespass to person 
26.80 The plaintiff in Goel Adesh Kumar v Resorts World at Sentosa 
Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 289 was gambling at the defendant’s casino when 
he was removed to a side room by employees of the defendant. The 
plaintiff alleged that he was assaulted and falsely imprisoned by the 
employees of the casino and the auxiliary police provided by SATS 
Security Services Pte Ltd (“SATS”). He sued the defendant, alleging it 
was vicariously liable for the torts of their employees and the auxiliary 
police. The defendant joined SATS as third parties seeking an indemnity 
for any wrongs attributable to SATS employees. 
26.81 On the false imprisonment claim, although the plaintiff 
voluntarily entered the room with the casino staff, Choo Han Teck J 
found that the plaintiff had been falsely imprisoned in the room from 
the moment he asked to leave and was prevented from doing so. The 
defendant’s argument that it was willing to release the plaintiff on 
condition that he left the premises immediately did not alter the fact of 
false imprisonment as the defendant had no lawful authority to detain 
the plaintiff. Choo J referred with approval to the Australian decision of 
Walter Vignoli v Syndey Harbour Casino [1999] NSWSC 1113 (“Walter”), 
a case with similar facts. The defendant casino had detained a patron 
and had argued that it was prepared to release the patron as long as the 
patron returned a sum of money that was paid to him by mistake. These 
cases suggest that the classic decision of Robinson v Balmain New Ferry 
[1910] AC 295 may no longer be followed as contemporary norms place 
a higher premium on personal liberty. 
26.82 Further, it was held that the detention power under s 180(1) of 
the Casino Control Act (Cap 33A, 2007 Rev Ed) was limited in its scope 
and applied only where the patron had committed, or was likely to 
commit, a specified crime. In addition, the patron had to be informed of 
the reasons for detention and the authorities had to be immediately 
informed. Choo J also found that the assault and battery claims were 
made out when the plaintiff was physically prevented from leaving and 
was involved in minor scuffles with the defendant’s and SATS’s 
employees. 
26.83 The vicarious liability claim against the defendant for the 
intentional torts committed by the auxiliary police failed. As the 
auxiliary police were employees of SATS, Choo J held that it was SATS 
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and not the defendant that was vicariously liable. The defendant could 
only be liable for the torts of its employees. On determining the extent 
of liability of the respective groups of employees, Choo J found that the 
casino employees were wholly liable for the false imprisonment and 
SATS’s employees were mainly responsible for the assault and battery. 
On a global view, Choo J found the defendant’s employees were 80% to 
blame. 
26.84 In assessing the damages for false imprisonment, Choo J 
awarded $4,000, noting that the detention was for a relatively short 
period (less than 50 minutes) in a comfortable room intended for 
patrons, unlike the plaintiff in Walter who was detained for six hours, 
following which he received A$30,000. The plaintiff claimed for various 
physical injuries which were assessed on conventional principles by 
Choo J, resulting in damages of $25,000 for pain and suffering, and just 
over $16,000 for pretrial medical expenses and transportation costs. 
26.85 The plaintiff also claimed over $400,000 in loss of earnings 
alleging that his injuries had caused him to lose a major client. This 
claim was dismissed by Choo J on the ground that the plaintiff had not 
discharged his burden of proof. The claims for aggravated and 
exemplary damages as well as for loss of the plaintiff ’s membership 
privileges were also dismissed. 
Remedies 
Personal injuries 
26.86 The appellant in Chua Ser Kenon v Karuppiah Jai Sankar [2015] 
SGHC 127 was a doctor who suffered, amongst other things, hip injury 
as a result of being knocked down by a lorry driven by the defendant. 
The defendant was found 75% liable and the assistant registrar awarded 
the plaintiff $39,384.24 (at 75%), which included $22,000 in general 
damages and $1,000 in nominal damages for lost earning capacity. No 
award was made for loss of future earnings. The appellant appealed 
against the assessment of damages, arguing that he should have been 
awarded significant amounts for loss of future earnings and lost earning 
capacity. 
26.87 Choo Han Teck J dismissed the appeal, holding that there was 
no evidence to suggest that the appellant’s injury would diminish his 
future earnings. Indeed, the appellant had been successful in applying 
for a place on the residency programme under SingHealth to qualify as 
an orthopaedic surgeon, and the supervisors at the department which 
accepted him were aware of his injuries, suggesting that they deemed 
him fit to practise as an orthopaedic surgeon upon qualification. 
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26.88 Mykytowych, Pamela Jane v VIP Hotel [2015] SGHC 113 
involved a plaintiff who slipped and fell at the lobby of the defendant’s 
hotel. The hotel was found 50% liable and this case involved the 
assessment of damages. The plaintiff claimed over $6m in total or just 
over $3m after the 50% reduction for contributory negligence, mainly 
for loss of earnings. Considering all the evidence, Choo Han Teck J did 
not accept the plaintiff ’s claims about the seriousness of the injury and 
its impact on her. He awarded a modest sum of $12,000 for pain and 
suffering, and about $6,000 for medical and transportation expenses. 
Trespass to land and loss of market value 
26.89 Paul Patrick Baragwanath v Republic of Singapore Yacht Club 
[2016] 1 SLR 1295 involved a trespass to land action by the plaintiff, 
a yacht club, against the defendant, the owner of a vessel that was 
berthed at the plaintiff ’s marina without permission. The District Judge 
found in favour of the plaintiff and awarded damages totalling 
$51,870.38, calculated on the basis of the length of the berth used by the 
plaintiff and varying rates for different periods of the stay. For the first 
period, the vessel shared a berth and paid half the visitors’ rate. For the 
second period, at which point the trespass began, a higher rate was used. 
For the third period, the vessel was berthed at a much longer berth, 
resulting in higher daily charges. 
26.90 The plaintiff appealed against the calculation of damages, 
arguing that the rate should have been based on the market value of the 
use of the berth. Choo Han Teck J analysed the legal basis for 
calculation of damages in trespass to land cases, referring to the Court 
of Appeal’s decision of ACES System Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily 
[2013] 4 SLR 1417 (“Yenty Lily”) where the court considered the user 
principle, noting that it consisted of both compensatory and 
restitutionary elements. Choo J observed that the Court of Appeal in 
Yenty Lily had preferred the view that the user principle should be 
grounded in restitution rather than compensation. The Court of Appeal 
further held that tort claims should ordinarily be resolved under the 
ordinary compensation approach. On that basis, Choo J held that the 
loss was the market value that the plaintiff would have charged for the 
use of its berth. That market value was to be determined by the daily 
rate for visitors, which according to the plaintiff ’s rules on berthing 
charges was calculated on the basis of the length of the vessel. On that 
basis, Choo J varied the damages awarded to $17,372.52. 
No interim injunction for claim in deceit 
26.91 Interim (mandatory) injunctions are not to be granted in an 
action in the tort of deceit according to the decision in Tiananmen KTV 
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(2013) Pte Ltd v Furama Pte Ltd [2015] 3 SLR 433. The owner (lessor) of 
premises stated to the plaintiff (lessee) that the lease would continue as 
long as the defendant did not redevelop the premises into a hotel. The 
plaintiff sued for deceit and applied for an interim injunction to restrain 
the defendant from repossessing the premises and to compel the 
defendant to reinstate the premises by restoring the electricity supply 
and removing blockades placed by the defendant. Though the 
defendant’s statement of intention could in law amount to a false 
representation (see Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459 at 483), 
the remedy of a mandatory injunction was not appropriate, according to 
Lee Seiu Kin J. A mandatory injunction, which is akin to an order for 
specific performance, was regarded as incompatible with the objective in 
deceit which was to restore the plaintiff back in the position as if the 
misrepresentation had not been made (Wishing Star Ltd v Jurong Town 
Corp [2008] 2 SLR(R) 909 at [28]). In any event, the potential loss of 
business, erosion of customer base and reinstatement of premises 
alleged by the plaintiff could be adequately compensated for by 
damages. 
Loss of chance 
26.92 Sports Connection Pte Ltd v Asia Law Corp [2015] 5 SLR 453 is 
the continuation of a legal saga that began in 1991. The plaintiff, 
a business dealing with sporting goods and equipment, was the 
registered proprietor of a trade mark in Singapore. It engaged a law firm, 
M/s Swami & Narayanan (“S&N”), to register the trade mark in 
Malaysia in 1991, but that registration was defective due to the law firm’s 
failure to comply with certain formalities. The plaintiff subsequently 
discovered other parties selling products under its trade mark in 
Malaysia. It sued S&N in Singapore in the tort of negligence, claiming 
for loss of profits of sales and the legal costs of litigation in Malaysia. 
The plaintiff also commenced actions in Malaysia against various 
parties. 
26.93 Following the outcome of some of the Malaysian litigation in 
favour of the plaintiff, S&N consented to liability and the focus turned 
to assessment of damages. During this period, the plaintiff commenced 
solicitor and client taxation in Malaysia with respect to the Malaysian 
actions. The defendant then came into the picture as the plaintiff ’s 
lawyers, taking over from the previous firm. A lawyer from the 
defendant’s firm advised the plaintiff to commission expert reports for 
the loss of profits and legal costs claims. In 2008, S&N offered to settle 
for a sum of $200,000 against which the defendant’s lawyer advised. 
Later that year, the assessment of damages in the Singapore claim was 
heard by the assistant registrar who decided that no loss of profits 
should be ordered on the ground of insufficient evidence and that 
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only 30% of the Malaysian legal costs should be awarded, with the 
remaining 70% to be claimed against the Malaysian parties, instead 
of S&N. 
26.94 The plaintiff sued the defendant in negligence with respect to its 
advice on the loss of profits claim, the legal costs claim and the decision 
not to settle based on the offer by S&N. The plaintiff argued that the 
defendant should have advised it to stay the Singapore assessment until 
the Malaysian judgment of 2012, which awarded the plaintiff 
RM6,975,754 against the Malaysian parties, as this would have provided 
evidence of loss of profits. Further, it was argued that the defendant 
should have obtained further and better evidence from the Malaysian 
parties to support the Singapore assessment. The plaintiff alleged that it 
had lost a chance of: 
(a) a better outcome in the Singapore assessment; 
(b) recovering the full solicitor and client costs; and 
(c) accepting the settlement offer. 
In addition, the plaintiff claimed wasted costs of pursuing litigation in 
Singapore and Malaysia. Belinda Ang Saw Ean J focused on the loss of 
chance analysis, referring to the leading UK decision of Allied Maples 
Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602 and the Singapore 
Court of Appeal’s decision of JSI Shipping (S) Pte Ltd v 
Teofoongwonglcloong [2007] 4 SLR(R) 460. Ang J also relied on the 
academic work of Sarah Green, distinguishing between two types of loss 
of chance claims: (a) where the chance exists independently of the 
defendant’s breach; and (b) where the chance and the breach of duty are 
interdependent: Sarah Green, Causation in Negligence (Hart Publishing, 
2015). The latter, in Green’s view, is not a proper loss of chance case with 
Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176 being a prime example. 
26.95 Applied to the facts, Ang J held that the claim in this case fell 
within the second category and therefore failed. Even if they were placed 
in the first category, on the facts the loss of chance was too remote; it 
was a “chance upon a chance” as there were too many imponderables 
from what the plaintiff would have done, to what the Singaporean 
assessors may have done and to what the Malaysian assessors might 
have done. 
Claim for damages by disappointed beneficiaries of will 
26.96 AEL (above, para 26.64) was an appeal against a High Court 
decision finding a solicitor, the second appellant (the first appellant 
being the law firm), liable to the disappointed beneficiaries of a will who 
suffered loss as a result of the solicitor’s negligence in executing the will. 
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Briefly, the facts were that the second appellant had prepared a will for 
an Indonesian testator to replace an older will. After the testator died, it 
was discovered that the new will was not valid as the second appellant 
had failed to ensure that there were two witnesses. As a result, letters of 
administration were obtained to distribute the assets in Singapore. The 
respondent beneficiaries received less than they would have had the new 
will been valid. They successfully sued the appellants for this loss and 
the cost of obtaining legal advice in Indonesia. 
26.97 On appeal, the appellants argued that the respondents had 
collaborated with the unintended beneficiaries to manufacture a claim 
against them and that the respondents had failed to mitigate their loss 
by failing to persuade the unintended beneficiaries to give up their share 
under intestacy. Chao Hick Tin JA dismissed the appeal, holding that 
the trial judge had made no error in finding that there was no collusion 
and that the respondents had attempted to mitigate the loss by 
negotiating with the unintended beneficiaries. Chao JA reiterated that 
the unintended beneficiaries were not legally obliged to give up their 
lawful inheritance. 
Apportionment of losses 
26.98 The appellant in Chong Kim Beng v Lim Ka Poh [2015] 
3 SLR 652, employed by the first and second respondents (who carried 
on a business under the name of Mysteel Engineering Contractor 
(“MEC”)), was deployed to work for the third respondent, Chee Seng 
Engineering Works Pte Ltd (“Chee Seng”), where he suffered a 
workplace injury. The appellant successfully sued all three respondents 
in negligence although the District Judge reduced damages by 10% for 
contributory negligence. The District Judge apportioned the damages 
between MEC and Chee Seng, holding MEC liable for 15% of the total 
loss and Chee Seng liable for 75%. The District Judge held that liability 
was not joint; therefore, MEC was liable for only 15% of the appellant’s 
loss and not 90%. 
26.99 The appellant appealed, arguing that liability should be joint, 
such that MEC should be liable for 90% of the loss. Chee Seng did not 
participate in the appeal and MEC argued that liability was not joint. 
Even though the pleadings did not specifically refer to joint and several 
liability, Woo Bih Li J found on the facts that the respondents were 
jointly liable. Although he found in favour of the appellant on the point 
under appeal, Woo J dismissed the appeal on the basis that the appellant 
had not proved that MEC’s breach of duty – assuming there was a 
breach of duty – had caused the damage. The duty in this case was to 
check whether the fan had a cover, but there was no evidence whether 
there was or was not a cover at the time when the risk assessment should 
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have taken place. Hence, it could not be proven that had a risk 
assessment been undertaken there would have been a different outcome. 
This case is unusual as the District Judge had made a clear finding on 
the facts that MEC was liable and MEC had not counter appealed on 
this point of liability. Woo J noted that his finding “exonerated MEC 
from any liability whatsoever”, but as MEC had not counter appealed, it 
remained liable for 15% of the appellant’s loss. 
26.100 Woo J also went on to observe that the Court of Appeal decision 
in Chandran (above, para 26.59) should not be read as laying down a 
rule that an employer must always carry out a risk assessment of third 
party sites where its employee is deployed. 
Limitation 
26.101 AXF v Koh Cheng Huat [2015] 5 SLR 819 involved a 
dependency claim by the husband of the deceased and their children 
against the first defendant, an obstetrician and gynaecologist, and the 
second defendant, a private medical centre. This was an appeal against 
the assistant registrar’s decision to strike out the claim on the ground 
that it was time barred under s 20(5) of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 
1999 Rev Ed) (“CLA”). Section 20(5) of the CLA provides that every 
dependency action “shall be brought within three years after the death 
of such deceased person”. The plaintiffs contrasted s 20(5) of the CLA 
with s 24A(2) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed) (“LA”) 
which provides as follows: 
An action to which this section applies, where the damages claimed 
consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the 
plaintiff or any other person, shall not be brought after the expiration 
of — 
(a) 3 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued; or 
(b) 3 years from the earliest date on which the plaintiff has the 
knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in 
respect of the relevant injury, if that period expires later than the 
period mentioned in paragraph (a). 
The plaintiffs argued that whereas the LA expressly prohibited claims 
beyond the three-year limit, the CLA limitation was expressed in a 
positive manner. Foo Chee Hock JC disagreed, holding that despite the 
different wording, the effect was the same – the limitation in s 20(5) was 
absolute. Foo JC supported this view by an extensive review of the 
relevant UK, Malaysian and Singapore authorities. The plaintiffs further 
argued that it would be unconscionable for the defendants to rely on the 
time bar in this case, relying on observations in the High Court of 
Australia decision of Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 
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(“Hawkins”). Foo JC noted that Hawkins was distinguishable, as Deane J 
had referred to wrongful acts of the defendant that impacted on the 
ability of the plaintiff to bring its action in a timely manner. 
26.102 The plaintiffs also relied on Lim Siew Bee v Lim Boh Chuan 
[2014] SGHC 41 (“Lim Siew Bee”) where the concept of unconscionable 
reliance was applied. However, Foo JC held that Lim Siew Bee, which 
concerned the interpretation of s 22 of the LA, was inapplicable to 
the CLA. It should be noted that this decision has been reversed by the 
Court of Appeal, which while agreeing with Foo JC’s analysis of the law, 
held that it would not be proper to strike out the claim when it was not 
clear that there had not been fraudulent concealment, which, if proved, 
might justify a court preventing the defendants from relying on the 
limitation argument. The Court of Appeal held that it was a triable issue 
and allowed the appeal by the plaintiffs (AXF v Koh Cheng Huat [2016] 
SGCA 22. 
26.103 In Suresh s/o Suppiah v Jiang Guoliang [2015] SGMC 31, the 
plaintiff filed suit on 7 January 2015 against the defendant for damages 
as a result of personal injuries suffered in an accident on 7 January 2012. 
Section 24A(2) of the LA provides for a three-year limitation period for 
cases of personal injuries. The issue was whether the three-year period 
included the day of the accident or began after that. Referring to local 
authorities on the point, District Judge Wong Peck held that it included 
the day of the accident; therefore, the last day to file suit would have 
been 6 January 2015. 
Vicarious liability and non-delegable duties 
26.104 As a general rule, the Singapore government may be vicariously 
liable for the acts of its public officers: see s 5 of the Government 
Proceedings Act (Cap 121, 1985 Rev Ed). There are, however, important 
statutory exceptions to this general position on vicarious liability. One of 
these exceptions relates to the acts of judges and judicial officers in the 
course of judicial proceedings. Section 6(3) of the Government 
Proceedings Act reads: 
No proceedings shall lie against the Government by virtue of section 5 
in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by any person while 
discharging or purporting to discharge any responsibilities of a judicial 
nature vested in him, or any responsibilities which he has in 
connection with the execution of judicial process. 
26.105 The appellants in AHQ v Attorney-General [2015] 4 SLR 760 
(“AHQ”) sued the Government in tort in respect of the court orders 
made against them by a judge. The suit against the Government was 
denied. First and foremost, there exists a long-standing common law 
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principle of judicial immunity with a view to ensuring judicial 
independence: see Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118. Its purpose is to 
safeguard the administration of justice and the finality of the judicial 
process, and not for the personal benefit of the judges. The position of 
the Government vis-à-vis the judges with respect to judicial acts are 
clearly different from that of the typical employer-employee or 
principal-agent relationships. Based on the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers, the Government should not interfere with the 
judges and judicial process; as such, they should not be vicariously liable 
for the acts of judges for which they do not have “control or influence”: 
AHQ at [35]. The general rule in s 5 of the Government Proceedings 
Act – which renders the Government liable for the tortious acts of its 
public officers in the same manner as would have been the case if the 
Government were an ordinary employer – must therefore give way 
where judicial acts are concerned. Note that whilst there are specific 
statutory provisions conferring judicial immunity on District Court 
judges, Magistrates, registrars and deputy registrars (s 68 of the State 
Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed)) and judicial officers in the Supreme 
Court (s 79 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 
2007 Rev Ed)), the judges of the Supreme Court (a superior court of 
record) enjoy immunity for acts done within as well as outside the limits 
of their jurisdiction. 
26.106 Ng Huat Seng and Kho Sung Chin v Munib Mohammad Madni, 
Zahrah Ayub and Esthetix Design Pte Ltd [2015] SGDC 315 involved 
damage to a neighbouring property as a result of construction work at 
the defendants’ premises. The first and second defendants owned a 
property which they wished to rebuild. They engaged the third 
defendant, an independent contractor, to demolish the existing house 
and build a new one. During the demolition works, the third defendant 
caused debris to fall from the first two defendants’ property on to the 
plaintiffs’ property, causing damage. The first two defendants’ property 
was on ground that was about 2m higher than the ground of the 
plaintiff ’s property. The plaintiffs sued the three defendants in 
negligence. The issues at trial were whether the third defendant was an 
independent contractor, whether the first two defendants had exercised 
reasonable care in appointing the third defendant, and whether the work 
was “so particularly hazardous and/or extra-hazardous” that the first 
two defendants owed a non-delegable duty to the plaintiffs. 
26.107 District Judge Seah Chi Ling found that the third defendant was 
an independent contractor and that the first and second defendants 
could not be held vicariously liable for its torts, if any. On the second 
issue, District Judge Seah held that there was no evidence showing that 
the first two defendants had been negligent in appointing the third 
defendant, who was properly qualified and about whom the first 
defendant had made inquiries and whose credentials the first defendant 
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had verified. The final argument that a non-delegable duty was owed 
was also dismissed. Referring to academic writing and judicial 
authorities, District Judge Seah noted that the extra-hazardous doctrine 
of liability was narrowly construed, and properly so. On the facts, 
ordinary demolition works could not be viewed as extra-hazardous such 
that a non-delegable duty could be imposed on the owners of the 
property on which such works were carried out. The third defendant did 
not make an appearance and District Judge Seah, relying on the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitar, found against the third defendant. 
26.108 Yu Hanjia v Kuah Thiam Seng [2015] SGDC 277 involved a 
claim by an employee against his employer following an assault at the 
work place by his supervisor. The issue was whether the employer 
should be held vicariously liable for the supervisor’s assault. 
District Judge Seah Chi Ling found that the employer was not in breach 
of its common law duty to provide a safe work place as there was no 
indication that the supervisor was prone to violence and there was no 
known animosity between the plaintiff and the supervisor. District 
Judge Seah found the defendant vicariously liable for the assault as the 
tort was closely connected to the employment. Referring to 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia 
Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2011] 3 SLR 540, District 
Judge Seah held that it was fair and just to hold the employer vicariously 
liable. 
26.109 Some of the factors considered included the fact that (a) the 
assault took place during work hours at the work place; (b) the 
supervisor was carrying out his normal duties of instructing 
workers; (c) the employment afforded the supervisor the opportunity to 
abuse his power; (d) his wrongful act furthered the employer’s aims as 
he was instructing the employee to store the employer’s equipment 
properly at the time of the assault; (e) the incident was related to friction 
and confrontation inherent in the enterprise; and (f) the supervisor had 
power over the employee, who was vulnerable. 
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